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Abstract  
 
This studyexamines the effect of market structure variables on stability subject to 
regulation and supervision variables. The Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) is 
employed over a sample of banks operating within the enlarged European Union 
during the period 2002-2010. The results show an inverse U-shaped association 
between market power and bank soundness and stabilizing tendency in markets of 
less concentration, where policies lean towards limited restrictions on non-interest 
bearing activities, official intervention to bank management and book transparency. 
However, in markets with higher share of foreign owned assets, the pattern is 
inverted. The significant impact of regulatory variables contributes to the ongoing 
reform as a stability channel of bank competition. 
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1. Introduction 
The deregulation process paves the way towards the intensification of 
competitive conditions, amid which financial institutions struggle to survive posing a 
threat to the potential incidence of financial crises. Systemic risk is large especially 
for incumbent whose market share and large enough to imply negative externalities to 
national economies in cases where cross-border activity is significant. 
The ongoing restructuring towards aggregate concentration for income 
diversification and risk management purposes has rendered financial regulation an 
imperative building upon the failing premises of Basel II. In the light of the present 
financial crisis, capital regulation has been deficient falling short of taking account of 
systemic effects, market discipline ineffective due to too-big-to-fail policies, risk 
evaluations deficient once we consider the operation of credit ratings agencies while 
supervision exhausted its jurisdiction to non-shadow banking system. In line with the 
ingoing debate on the dynamics of competition and financial stability taking into 
consideration contemporary institutional reforms we shed light on the dynamics of 
competition in associating with the evergreen topic of financial stability. 
The contribution of the underlying paper is threefold: first, it contributes to 
thelimitedliterature
2
 focusing exclusively on Europe although some studies in 
theirinternational samples includethe European region(Schaeck and Cihak, 2008; 
Boyd et al., 2009; De Nikolo and Loukoianova, 2007; Berger et al., 2009; Laeven and 
Levine, 2009). Second, the U-shaped relationship of competition and financial 
stability is investigated empirically since no one but Berger et al. (2009) and Beck et 
al. (2012) allowed for it. Third, it is challenging to see if the effects of concentration 
and market power are insensitive to the variation of differentinformational sets. In the 
light of new data on regulation and supervision by the World Bank, this study for the 
first time utilises them
3
 following a new methodology known only in the cross-
country growth literature.  
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 Cipollini and Fiordelisi (2009), Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) and Agoraki et al. (2009) for the 
Southestern region. 
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 See appendix for detailed description (Barth et al., 2013). 
2. Theory 
The analysis
4
 of the underlying relationship stems from the seminal 
contribution of Keeley (1990) following those of Marcus (1984) and Chan et al. 
(1986), who proposed the ‘franchise (charter) value’ paradigm, that is if the 
diminishing market power of banks,in line with the emergence of great competitive 
pressures, squeezes profit margins, banks in order to recoup increased returns take 
refuge in risky projects. Bank failures are likely to occur when adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems indicate that banks are getting more reluctant to monitor 
borrowers and thereby falling short of exploiting the benefits of relationship banking 
(Boot and Greenbaum, 1993). Thus, loan portfolios tend to comprise marginal 
applicants and potentially exacerbate the risk exposure (Allen and Gale, 2000). In 
contrast, monopolistic banking markets promote the prudent conduct of banks in 
engaging in less risky projects amid conditions of more profit-making opportunities 
and capital cushions (Beck, 2008).  
However, another severe source of instability is traced at the liability side; 
thanks to the ongoing deregulation of financial markets, interest rates have slumped 
on the sly ever since the endeavour of removing entry barriers and expanding 
restrictions flourished. In such a situation, banks strive to curb low franchise value 
and profitability engaging in riskier asset allocation given that in hard times of 
insolvency and banks runs, deposit insurance schemes are stand by to intervene. 
Hence, it is deemed to be essential for the authorities to impose restrictions on deposit 
competition to discourage ‘gambling for resurrection’ (Cole et al., 1995). 
On the top of that, Matutes and Vives (1996) consider the self-fulfilling 
expectations of depositors to endogenously affect the quality – or the failure 
probability - of a bank. In other words, the bank withhigh depositors’ trust will enjoy 
higher margins and greater market share as perceived to be diversified and hence safer 
in their eyes. In addition, they examine the welfare implications of deposit insurance 
equilibria: notwithstanding the positive impact of insurance in preventing crises, 
mitigating transport costs and extending the market, deposit insurance guarantee that 
all banks are credible. Hence, in the absence of no expected diversification gains to 
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 See Carletti and Hartman (2003), Beck (2008) and Vanhoose (2010) for a comprehensive theoretical 
and empirical review. 
exploit, all banks are discounted at the same rate and the resulting higher competition 
hits high failure probabilities. If decisive regulatory authorities allow for takeovers of 
the failed banks, banks’ assets remain put contributing further to financial stability 
(Perotti and Suarez, 2000). However, the assumption that concentration is conducive 
for lower competition is erroneous but, at least, possible to bring about financial 
stability if the preservation of long-term relationships can exploit the private and 
exclusive information about the way liquidity needs are probabilistically distributed 
(Smith, 1984).  
Even it is the case that anticompetitive conductis not an inherent feature of 
large banks, a relative market structure may induce stability effects in the presence of 
well-diversified portfolios and economies of scale (Diamond, 1984; Williamson, 
1986). The size, therefore, does matter in concentrated markets and recent economic 
history advocates fewer episodes of bank insolvency and runs occurred in Canada 
than in U.S. (Allen and Gale, 2000). Capie (1995) show less competitive market 
structures in UK to be stable during the period 1840 and 1940 and sustainably 
profitable in the past few decades as compared to the variable performance of German 
banks. The argument here is in favour of large banks and concentrated markets, upon 
which supervisory authorities can bear the burden of monitoring and regulating. 
The other strand of literature contending the competition-stability nexus 
emanates from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), who showed that monopolistic market 
structures are to be blamed for great charges on loans and thereby upcoming defaults. 
Safe borrowers are repelled by high borrowing costs and information asymmetries 
render a significant part of loans nonperforming and hence constituent of financial 
instability. Boyd and De Nikolo  (2005) employed the loan market channel in their 
analysis to conclude that the positive relationship between risk and competition is 
fragile. As monopolistic structures increase loan rates, borrowers surrender to riskier 
projects. Thus, the probability of default rates is conditional on banks’ pricing 
conduct in the loan markets.  
That is not the case for the model of mean shifting investment technologies by 
Koskela and Stenbacka (2000), since higher competition diminishes the loan rates 
without necessarily triggering default risk in equilibrium out of the increased 
demanded volume of investments. Caminal and Matutes (2002) found that 
monopolistic markets, bearing the costs of monitoring, tend to be more susceptible to 
risky loans and thereby subsequent failures. Thus, failing credit rationing, bank 
willingness to loan out places the bank course in jeopardy. On the other hand, De 
Nikolo and Luchetta (2009) proved out of a general equilibrium framework that 
efficiency, optimal portfolio quality and diversification rents best feature competitive 
markets, though non-perfect competition constitutes second-best alternative.   
On the other hand, Allen and Gale (2004) put forward a number of theoretical 
models of competition and financial stability trying to shed light on the multifaceted 
underlying relationship.  They include aspects like spatial and Schumpeterian 
competition, agency costs, financial intermediaries and contagion to highlight the 
efficient levels of potential trade-off between competition and stability. It is Pareto 
optimal, though socially undesirable, to have instability in cases of a) perfect 
competition and complete markets, b) present agency problems due to the incentive to 
acquire greater market share and ‘last bank standing effect’ (Perotti and Suarez, 
2002)
5
 and c) many banks occupying the same locations and lacking innovation 
(Schumpeterian competition). Contagion might well be an outcome triggered by the 
systemic risk of an aggregate shock on liquidity only where competitive interbank 
market leaves price takers off to liquidate their assets.  
Under the perspective of supervision and precautionary regulation, interesting 
arguments have been articulated in the literature. The assertion that it is easier to 
monitor few and large banks rather than much more and smaller banks, does not 
cohere with operating complexity of large entities. Under conditions of expanding 
restructurings, universal banks and conglomerates provide the whole spectrum (or 
part of) of financial services - e.g. consulting (M&As), instrument and proprietary 
trading (derivatives included), stock broking, investment management, insurance – 
which have been previously offered by more specialized banks, such as commercial, 
investment, and merchant banks. The subject is apparently multifarious for 
supervisory authorities to inspect and timely intervene rendering financial instability a 
presumptive reality. On the contrary, the mandate of having concentrated markets at 
the convenience of authorities, policies are likely to lean towards the provision of 
large subsidies and bail-outs in an attempt to eschew from impawning the viability of 
too-big-to-fail banks. Under the auspices of such tutelar policies, bank managers have 
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 Supporting the competition-stability literature, it concedes the prudent bank behavior as precipitated 
by the probability of the other market players be hit by random solvency shock. In the end, duopolies 
turn out to produce great monopoly rents.  
an incentive to take risks potentially exacerbating the contagion risk of large and 
insolvent banks (Mishkin, 1999).  
Without constraining ourselves to surrender to any side of contending 
hypotheses, it could be the case that there exists a matching point. Martinez-Miera 
and Repullo (2010) concur that there exists a U-shaped relationship between 
competition and bank failure risk. In particular, monopolistic markets experience the 
risk-shifting effect, that is more competition with low loan rates stabilizes banks as 
they run less risk of default whereas the margin effect – lower revenues of total non-
defaulting loans may jeopardize banks in view of potential entries – occurs usually in 
competitive markets. 
 
3. Methodology 
The decision upon which variables are theoretically and empirically grounded 
to constitute the crux of deterministic group is not that apparent. The underlying 
literature has proposed different econometric modelling – (e.g) GMM methodology, 
panel, probit, logit models and duration analysis, etc. – and various determinants of 
bank risk of failure. Such unwieldy bulk of variables amounts to almost 50 variables 
that end up with mixed results depending each time on the econometric specification 
and the independent set of the regression model. On those grounds, this paper 
considers interesting the prospect of analysing the statistical power of key effects 
(market power, concentration) of bank risk conditioned to the variation of every 
single subset of variables. In other words, utilising Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) as 
set out by Leamer (1983; 1985) and Leamer and Leonard (1983), the partial 
correlations of dependent and independent variables are examined to endorse whether 
such relationships are fragile or robust at standard confidence levels.  
Hence, the employed methodology is a sensitivity analysis of linear modelling 
regarding multiple regressions of bank risks on explicit groups of variables. We 
embark upon the group of interest that comprises the effects of market power and 
concentration along with their quadratic terms to allow for non-linearities. Along the 
lines, both centrifugal strands of literature can be verified without precluding the 
significant power of the other. The following steps of analysis include reasonable 
subsets of cautiously pooled variables that one can identify as statistically significant 
in the literature. Schematically,   
 
Financial stability (lnZ) = f [Market structure variables (Lt-1, CONC), institutional 
(I), macroeconomic (M), bank-specific factors (Bt-1)] + ε            (1) 
In this model, the variables of interest are market power and, secondarily, 
concentration. The Lerner index (L)isappropriate to capture the pricing conduct of 
banksafter extrapolating marginal costs through the standard stochastic modelling of 
equation (3) along with the estimation of the partial derivative of total costs with 
respect to total assets (equation 4). Concentration is proxied by Herfindahl-Hirschman 
ratio (ΗΗΙ) since it is deemed in the literature to delineate real market conditions in 
antitrust policies and represent the stepping-stone of SCP paradigm. The selection of 
both measures that have drawn attention in the empirical analysis is cautious of the 
fact that they have been overwhelmingly applied in the literature interchangeably to 
explain market conditions
6
; in the following analysis, I opt to plug them both in 
regressions to compare the accruing evidence.  
All variables allowed to have variation at the bank level, namely competition 
and several other controls that encompass the banks’ business model, are lagged one 
period to avoid reverse causality among them. In other words, the endogeneity of 
market power may reflect the impact of insolvency on market structure and pricing 
conduct of banks subsequently. The fact that country-level factors remain free to 
interact concurrently provides a prima facie insight of the potential drivers of 
heterogeneity. In addition, the fact that the some countries (specially Germany) are 
highly represented in the sample, the analysis employs the inverse of the number of 
banks operating within each market in a way to avoid any such bias and guarantee 
error clustering at the country level. 
The bound analysis kicks off at the point where the baseline model regresses 
financial stability on the variables of interest (L, CONC) after controlling for other 
bank-specific specificities (B) and adverse macroeconomic conditions (M) across the 
region to deduct as much a possible the error effects and convey real depiction in 
levels and significance of the underlying coefficients. Various bank-specific factors 
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stability in the literature. 
are also employed to encompass different aspects of banks’ balance sheet, income 
structure, corporate governance and general strategic planning investigating. As a 
next step thereafter, institutional factors that allow for different legal systems, 
regulatory schemes and market discipline mandates (I) are plugged in to construct the 
bounds of the market structure coefficients. 
Thus, the extreme upper and low bounds of the coefficient values are 
constructed by allowing for all possible combinations of I-effects expanding the 
analysis up to 10 regressions for each model. The degree, to which partial correlations 
between market structure and financial stability are robust or fragile,is defined by the 
persistence of the sign and the statistical significance in-between the range of the 
bound. Otherwise, the variables of interest should be treated with less confidence as 
far as their causal effect on risk is concerned since the fragility in the underlying 
relationships in terms of sign and statistical inference is contingent on the employed 
information set. However, the analysis does not aim to come up with a single model 
that breaks down the competition-(in)stability nexus, rather to assess the 
interconnections in between considering what has been proposed in the empirical 
literature and always on the mandate of ever-afresh institutional reform.  
My endeavour is to resolve the adverse results on the relationship between 
competition and concentration through the employment of the quadratic term of 
Lerner index to verify whether it is the case of U-shaped relationship. The underlying 
addition comes ad hoc, only in the models that construct the extreme bounds of 
competition and concentration so as to estimate the infection point; that is, the value 
of competition above which the relationship of soundness-competition alters; 
otherwise, the use of it in all model combinations would blur the effective bounds. In 
case of no significance in the coefficient of the Lerner index that constructs the 
extreme bounds, I opt to utilise a different information set of the same size.  
Moreover, the aim of gauging the impact of country-level variables on risk 
seems to be insufficient, if not inappropriate due to the possibility that the underlying 
effect may not be expressed in levels but also in slopes (model 2). Hence, the model 
includes interaction terms between country-level factors and the Lerner index along 
with lagged bank-specific controls. However, the only drawback with this approach is 
that interaction terms may bring about multicollinearity problems that are partially 
counterbalanced by more degrees of freedom due to the regression analysis conducted 
on a whole sample. Such problems are depicted in inflated standard errors and, 
consequently, in higher coefficients revealing thereby a potential weak-data problem; 
the latter consists in the little variation of a specific independent factor to determine 
cross-sectional differentials(Levine and Renelt, 1992). The model is schematically the 
following: 
 
ln Z  f Lt1,CONC * Lt1, I * Lt1,M * Lt1,Bt1          (2) 
The variable of interest is the Lerner index (L)alogside concentration (CONC), 
both included in the analysis simultaneously since they tend to reflect different 
features of bank competitiveness. Second, I utilise all possible combinations of two 
and three I-variable sets in order to juxtapose the results comprisingfive bank-specific 
variables, three country-level variables, a procedure that comes along the lines of 
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Barro (1991). 
 
4. The model 
We should first estimate the price mark-up over marginal cost (Lerner index) 
combining the estimation of average prices and marginal costs at the bank level.  The 
average prices are estimated over total assets (TA) along the lines of Shaffer (1993) 
and Berg and Kim (1994), instead of other earning assets in an attempt to expand as 
much as possible the observations of the sample since 2002. First, we have to estimate 
marginal costs by means of running a translog cost function, similar to the version of 
Turk Ariss (2010) that excludes the use of price of borrowed funds as input price on 
the grounds that it presumably captures some degree of monopoly power of 
incumbent banks in the deposit market. The employed model takes the following 
form:  
 
 
 
             (3) 
 where TC: total costs (total operating costs (interest expenses, personnel and 
other costs), Q: total bank output or total assets, W1: price of labour (personnel 
expenses over total assets), W2: price of physical capital (other operating expenses 
over fixed assets), Z1: fixed assets deflated by total equity, Z2: Off-balance sheet 
activities deflated by total equity and T: time trend. Fixed effects modeling accounts 
for different bank specificities and the estimation of model (3) separately for each 
banking market seems to reflect different technologies in the region. Time dummies 
also interact with the deterministic kernel in order to capture time-varying and non-
neutral technological progress in the banking sector. Homogeneity of degree one in 
input prices (Σγk=1) and symmetry conditions in all quadratic terms are imposed in 
model (3).  
When it comes to the estimation of the Lerner index, the extrapolation of the 
marginal costs by running the following model, which is schematically the partial 
derivative of total costs with respect to total assets (see Berger et al. 2009; Turk Ariss, 
2010): 
 
 
We are then able to construct the Lerner index (L) with respect to specific bank 
activities before delving into the analysis of competition determinants. According to 
the following structural model,  
 
 
AR denotes the average revenue of banks estimated by total income over total assets 
and MC the marginal cost derived through model (4). Their subscripts signify the use 
of Lerner index as the only proxy of market power at the bank level over time. I then 
estimate the natural logarithm of Z-score, which have been widely accepted in the 
(4) 
(5) 
literature as the most reliable proxy of distance from a situation of insolvency. I 
compute it in the form of the following expression,  
 
 
where ROA: returns on assets, EQ/TA: total equity to total assets, σ(ROA): standard 
deviation of returns on assets, all expressed at for bank i at time t. It is interpreted as 
the number of standard deviations by which ROA should fall under the mean so as to 
extinguish the equity of a bank (Boyd and Runkle, 1993). To avoid time invariance of 
the denominator, a three-year rolling window is implemented so as to potentially 
attribute the variation of the Z-score not only to the variation of profitability and 
capital, but also to the volatility of bank profitability. When it comes to set it as a 
dependent variable, the natural logarithm of Z-score normalises its extreme values 
due to high skewness. In the literature, any possible negative values are alleviated by 
transforming them through truncation at zero point [ln(1+Z-score)] or winsorising at 
1% level and then taking logs. Since the latter produces non-negative values, I opt for 
it.  
 
5. Determinants of stability 
5.1. Bank-specific variables 
Asset size has been used in the literature (e.g. Liu et al., 2012) in an attempt to 
see whether financial stability comes from managers attitude to exploit scale 
economies or by the perception that too-big-to-fail policies will constitute the facility 
of last resort in the form of governmental subsidies, among others.Capital ratio is the 
value of total equity deflated by a bank’s total assets. We employ it to account for 
differentials in risk preference behaviour of bank managers along the lines of Schaeck 
and Cihak (2008) and Berger et al. (2009).  Cost efficiency turns out to be the most 
widely employed accounting variable that proxy for cost efficiency as contemporary 
efficiency modelling may produce bias due to certain methodological and 
econometric assumptions. A negative effect on stability is expected since inefficient 
(6) 
banks tend to engage in risky behaviour to make up for insufficient performance 
(Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009).  
Liquidity is controlled for by the ratio of liquid assets over customer deposits 
and short-term funding. It measures what percentage of deposits and funding can be 
served in case there is a suddenly bank run. The higher this ratio is the less vulnerable 
a bank is vis-à-vis a deposit run-off case. We see similar proxies in the literature, such 
as liquid assets over liquid liabilities or over total assets (Laeven and Levine, 2009; 
Olivero et al., 2010), with no substantial difference in practice. Diversification 
indicates the ability of a bank to expand its operations to off-balance sheet activities, 
namely to insurance, real estate and securities activities; thus, a standard proxy is the 
total non-interest operating income over total. I expect a negative association between 
diversification and risk but it also might be the case that banks with high-income 
diversification are exposed to greater risks in their attempt to accomplish economies 
of scope (Stiroh, 2004).  
 
5.2. Macroeconomic variables 
GDP growth rate has been employed by the studies of Bonfirm and Dai 
(2009), Jimenez et al. (2013) and Olivero et al. (2010) in order to control for different 
stages of economic development. As for its expected effect, higher customer demand 
after the adoption of Euro may resulted in better managerial efficiency in terms of a 
relatively superior utilisation of production factors (Conrad et al., 2009). Economic 
prosperity reduced the probability of a potential bank crisis, which usually comes 
along with loan risk during economic recessions. On the other hand, loan losses can 
occur during economic booms if high growth GDP rates promote optimistic 
evaluations over borrowers’ creditworthiness leading to less stringent policies, and 
when competitive structures make managers more willing to risk-taking activities 
(Jimenez and Saurina, 2006).  
Boyd et al. (2004) underscore inflation as another key determinant of bank 
failure. When the nominal rate of interest  (inflation) is below a certain threshold, a 
relatively higher probability of bank failure is present in monopolies on the grounds 
that the incentive of loaning out cash reserves dominates that of paying low rates on 
deposit accounts. Secondly, asset loss is greater in competitive structures in times of a 
crisis, as monopolies tend to make profits upon the liquidation of assets (e.g. deposits) 
except cash, for they are able to provide inter-temporally much lower deposit 
insurance.Stock market turnover is defined as the total value of trended shares over 
the average stock market capitalisation. I employ the degree of liquidity in stock 
markets in order to take account of alternative funding means of firms, which may be 
related to greater dissemination of credit information and, thus, to greater bank 
soundness (Beck et al., 2012).  
 
5.3. Regulatory environment 
Capital regulatory index measures the degree of regulation on bank capital 
that should be set aside as a buffer for potential market and credit risks. In particular, 
it is about the initial capital stringency, that is which type - and to what extent - of 
regulatory funds other than cash, governmental securities or borrowed funds, is 
appropriate and verifiable by the official regulatory authorities. It is also about the 
overall capital stringency, according to which the regulatory capital is estimated 
accounting for risks and value losses. Thus, we quantify it by ascribing values of 0 or 
1 to every single one of the nine questions included in the appendix, with the 
observations ranging between 0 (no stringency) and 9 (high stringency). After the 
advent of Euro, the necessity to build upon the inefficient or inadequate regulatory 
directives as set out by the Accord of the Basel Committee (Basel I, Basel II and III) 
constitute the product of sedulous research. Empirical studies are split between the 
invigorating effects of capital requirements on less loan losses and the detrimental 
implications on risk-taking. Required reserves of capital may constitute sufficient 
buffers in view of potential liquidity shocks notwithstanding the case of banks 
embarking on gambling behaviour in order to make up either for the utility loss of 
powerful bank owners (Laeven and Levine, 2009), or for the diminishing franchise 
values (Hellman et al., 2000). 
Official supervisory power measures the degree of supervisory power 
exercised by the official authorities and their ‘intervention’ to the decisions of bank 
managers. It takes values from 0 to 10 ascribing 0 and 1 to negative and positive 
responses, respectively. From a theoretical perspective, strong supervision tends to 
demoralise managers to engage in excessive risk-taking - especially in countries with 
low accounting requirements (Fernandez and Gonzalez, 2005) - whereas it may be 
associated with corruption in lending transactions, and obstruction of bank operations 
(Barth et al., 2004).    
Private monitoring index is indicating the degree of information released to 
the public and officials relative to requirements of auditing authorities and credit 
rating agencies. It takes values between 0 and 10 after taking into account the ‘no’ 
and ‘yes’ responses of 10 questions, respectively. Hence, higher values highlight 
greater private insight over the economic performance of banks. It has been 
overlooked in the literature and only recently has been utilised by Schaeck et al. 
(2009), who argue about the insignificant concentration due to the common practice 
of investors, regulatory authorities and credit agencies to inspect large entities closely.  
Activity restrictions is an interesting variable commensurate with the extent to 
which bank activities like securities, insurance and real estate activities are under 
constraint. In particular, it takes the responses of ‘prohibited’, ‘restricted’, ‘permitted’ 
or ‘unrestricted’ and we quantify them by assigning the values of 4, 3, 2 and 1, 
respectively. We, finally, get the average value of the overall index and draw remarks 
over the degree of activity restriction. In the literature, there are two strands of 
reasoning in favour or against their effect on bank soundness. In cases when such 
restrictions forbid banks to engage in more risky projects, financial stability is evident 
(Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009). However, if banks are restricted to diversify their 
portfolio to non-interest bearing products, the concomitant utility loss induces 
powerful bank owners to riskier conduct (Laeven and Levine, 2009).  
Foreign ownershiphas been employed (e.g. Yeyati and Micco, 2007) is 
calculated as the total assets of banks, which are owned by foreigners with more than 
50% stake, as a percentage to the total assets of the banking system they operate 
within. The issues related to penetration of foreign banks in a national market are the 
screening costs of local customers that tend to attenuate through acquired experience, 
and the guarantees of the parent bank that constitute a safety net in times of 
insolvency and liquidity shocks (De Nikolo and Loukoianova, 2007; Claessens et al. 
2001).  There is also the option to pick up national banks of monopolisic markets 
(dodging competition hypothesis), higher operational efficiency (cream skimming 
hypothesis), or large market shares through branches and subsidiaries (quest for 
market power hypothesis).  
 
6. Data 
The sample includes financial data of at most 2450 banks headquartering in 
the enlarged European Union (27-EU). The data are from consolidated accounts of the 
Bankscope database, and when that is not possible, the use of unconsolidated 
accounts is the second-best solution. The data amount to 12118observations for the 
period 2003-2010 and pertain to EU-15 and EU-12 subgroups of the European 
Union
7
. The decision to analyse a period after the crack of the financial meltdown 
emanates from the latest update of supervision and regulatory variables
8
 in the World 
Bank. To avoid losing observations-outliers in an already limited sample, I winsorize 
at 1% level of the distribution of the Lerner index and the Z-score to smooth out their 
impact and come up with robust standard errors. The sample alsoincludes the whole 
spectrum of productive specialisation
9
 in European banking after careful elimination 
of double counting for every single case. 
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 contains summary statistics of the key bank-specific and regulation 
variables employed throughout the main econometric part. Each column exhibits the 
mean values per country as well as the average of the developed and developing 
region
10
. In particular, EU-15 is far more stable throughout the period 2003-2010; 
Germany and Spain stand out as the best performers in contrast with Finland and 
Greece, which are below the average of EU-12. In the latter case, Slovenia, Bulgaria 
and Poland enjoy greater bank soundness whereas Cyprus, Estonia and Latvia lie 
below the lowest score of EU-15 countries. Furthermore, harsher monopolistic 
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 EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
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Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. 
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 In particular, through the use of questionnaires disseminated in many financial institutions, the 
methodology followed to construct the I-variables is explicitly encompassed in the appendix as 
retrieved from Barth et al. (2013). 
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 Bank holding and holding companies, Clearing institutions and custody, Commercial banks, 
Cooperative banks, Finance companies (Credit card, Factoring and Leasing), Group finance 
companies, Investment and Trust corporations, Investment banks, Islamic banks, Micro-financing 
institutions, Other non-banking credit institutions, Private banking and Asset management companies, 
Real estate and mortgage banks, Saving banks, Securities firms and Specialised governmental credit 
institutions. 
10
 Bulgaria and Romania is included in the EU-10 as they constitute the enlarged Southeastern part of 
European Union. 
conditions occur in UK (80.3%) and, especially in Lithuania (76.4%) and Malta 
(63.9%). In contrast, Finland, Ireland and Cyrus have negative values of the Lerner 
index, indicating an irrational behaviour or predatory pricingon banking products. The 
rest variables provide a clear snapshot of the special characteristics of each banking 
market and the country-level conditions of the economy, regulation and supervision. 
 
[Insert table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 contains information on pair wise correlations of the country-specific 
variables employed in the analysis. As we can see, correlation is significant at 5% 
level between the variables of regulation and supervision. In particular, countries with 
high inflation experience higher market concentration andgrowth rates of GDP, which 
come in line with transaction activity in the stock market. Moreover, the decisive 
intervention of supervisory authorities to the decisions of bank managers is correlated 
with more regulation on bank capital and markets of more foreign-owned banks while 
it appears as a substitute mechanism to correct imprudent practices through less bank 
information required by public authorities. However, such transparency in a market of 
incumbent banks also appears as a policy complement to restrictions imposed on non-
traditional banking activity. 
 
7. Main results 
Table 3 displays the results of the sensitivity analysis conducted to see 
whether and to what extent factors of regulation and supervision have an independent 
impact on bank soundness. The baseline model in the first column excludes 
everything but the macroeconomic and bank-specific controls while the rest 
comprises the results we add one key variable at a time in order to see the variables of 
market structure. The coefficient of Lerner remains significant with a negative effect 
except in the last two columns, where it loses significance; in contrast, the underlying 
effect turns positive when the model allows for capital regulation.Concentration in the 
banking market enters with negative bearing on bank soundness persistently at 1% 
significance level.  
There is an explicit significance of regulatory variables when they are assessed 
individually notwithstanding official supervision enters with no explanatory power. 
Once we plug them all in the model their compound effect turns out to be significant 
at 1% level. Significance of activity restrictions
11
 denotes that managers are restricted 
to enter other non-traditional business lines for diversification purposes, taking on 
more risks and exacerbating thereby their portfolio risk exposure. On the contrary, 
capital regulation enters significant at 1% level fostering stability to the banking 
sector. Hence, more capitalization makes banks immune to liquidity shocks although 
the opportunity cost of such a ‘tax burden’ in cases of powerful owners, constitute a 
considerable motive for risk taking by means of monopolistic conduct (Laeven and 
Levine, 2009). Similarly, foreign ownership is related to bank stability meaning that 
the openness to foreign institutions leads to competition and profit margins due to the 
adoption of better practices that enhance further operational performance. Bank 
soundness peters out as official supervision becomes more stringent on the grounds 
that some degree of corruption in lending activities undermines systemic efficiency 
(Beck et al., 2006b). Last, private monitoring is highly significant with a negative 
bearing on banking system stability despite the fact that too-big-to-fail banks have 
been subject to close monitoring and inspection due to their potential systemic 
repercussions. Hence, there is a motive for excessive risk-taking among incumbent 
banks without hampering the effect of concentration.  
Once the whole set of I-variables enters the model, the same pattern holds for 
regulation variables with no credit at least for the stand-alone explanatory power of 
foreign ownership. Considering possible policies, an increase in ACT, CAP, OFF, 
PRIV by one standard deviation leads to a Z-score change of -2.9%, 11.4%, -15.9% 
and -11.7%
12
, respectively.In fact, there are many possible scenarios of regulatory 
reforming, combining the above effects towards a more rationalised too-big-to-fail 
banking system.  
Furthermore, times of high market demand as expressed by GDP growth make 
banks utilize production factors in a more efficient way of diminishing average costs 
(Conrad et al., 2009), while the combination of policies altogether are able to boost 
                                                        
11
 The stabilizing effect of activity restrictions is found by Berger et al. (2009) and Beck et al. (2012) 
unlike Beck et al. (2006a), Laeven and Levine (2009) and Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) advocating to 
the contrary.  
12
  The estimation emanates from the respective coefficients multiplied by their standard deviation 
[ACT: 2.069, CAP: 1.462, OFF: 2.314, PRIV: 1.382].  
further the impact of the business cycle towards more stabilising practices. In contrast 
to the persistent positive effect of GDP growth, the stand-alone impact of inflation on 
bank stability is significantly negative highlighting possibly the incentive of loaning 
out cash reserves rather than paying low deposit rates. More liquidity in stock markets 
has considerable bearing on financial fragility, which is not expected. That may 
reflect the risk-shifting tendency of banks towards non-traditional activities, herding 
behaviour, among others. 
A significantly positiverelationship is also evident between asset size and bank 
soundness coupled with a fragile effect of cost inefficiency. Hence, I conclude that the 
exploitation of economies of scale is below par insofar as government subsidies and 
other ‘too-big-to-fail’ policies operate as last resort mechanisms for managers with 
excessive risk-taking tendency. That also is in line with Schaeck and Cihak (2013), 
who consider efficiency as a significant channel of stability through competition.   
Furthermore,the equity ratiodemonstrates, though not persistently, its positive bearing 
at 1% significance level as it constitutes a buffer that insulates a bank from low 
profitability or profit volatility commensurate with the degree of managers’ risk 
aversion. Moreover, portfolio diversification is explicitly significant in jeopardizing 
bank stability as banks on their way to accomplish economies of scope engage in 
excessive risk-taking (Stiroh, 2004). The same destabilizing pattern lies in the 
coefficient of liquidity ratio implying excessive opportunity cost that is potentially 
compensated by risky portfolio allocations. 
 
[Insert table 3 here] 
 
Then EBAthroughany possible combination of regulatory variables attempts 
to verify whether there exists a persistent effect of market power and concentration in 
sign and significance. Hence, the coefficient of Lerner index takes significant values 
at 1% level ranging between -0.368 and 0.096 when I include [ACT, OFF] and [CAP, 
PRIV] in the model, respectively. Hence, an increase of one standard deviation in the 
Lerner index drives to a relative change of the Z-score ranging from -8% to +2.1%. 
Concentration reports no switch in impact sign and proves to be stable in its 
relationship with bank soundness across all possible regressions. It takes values from -
0.009 when [OFF, PRIV] come into play, to -0.008 with [ACT, CAP, PRIV] 
variables.  
In the next two arrows below the grey ones, the models that constructonly the 
extreme bounds of Lerner and concentration comprise the quadratic term of market 
power to verify whether, and to what extent, it is the case of non-linear relationship 
between Lerner index and Z-score. The linear effect of market power takes values 
between the range [0.785, 0.585] and the narrower one [0.608, 0.760] for the extreme 
bounds of the Lerner index and HHI, respectively. The former bounds indicate 
fragility in the underlying relationship as opposed to the significance at 1% level in 
the latter. On the other hand, the respective bounds for the quadratic term are [-1.071, 
-0.603] and [-0.875, -1.213] while t-values show persistent explanatory power. It is 
therefore concluded that the U-shaped relationship between competition and risk does 
exist and sign change occurs at the infection points [0.733, 0.970] and [0.695, 0.627], 
where concentration and market power get close to their limits. In another perspective 
of Lerner (concentration) EBA, profits have to fall before equity is fully depleted by 
17.4%-12.9% (13.5%-16.9%) more standard deviations if market power increases by 
one standard deviation. However, when market power takes values more than 0.733 
(0.627), a reduction of market power by one standard deviation makes profits 
diminish by 23.8%-13.4% (19.4%-26.9%) more standard deviations before equity 
capital is totally depleted.   
 
[Insert table 4 here] 
 
In table 5, I replicate the procedure by allowing for the effect of country-level 
factors not only to take place in levels but also in the slope of the competition-stability 
nexus. The linear effect of Lerner index is quite stable in its positive sign and 
persistence in the sensitivity analysis of model 2. Market power drives to bank 
stability in markets of limited concentration where we see effective systems of less 
restrictions on bank activities, more capital requirements, less share of foreign-owned 
banks, limited intervention of supervisory authorities on a bank’s decisions and less 
private monitoring. In the assessmentof the stand-alone impact of foreign ownership,I 
marginally reject its bearing on stability at 10% level while market power and its 
interaction with concentration are neutralised. Thus, foreign penetration and any 
policy conducive to it fail to explain the variation of the Z-score as long as they are 
seconded by supplementary initiatives. The expected effect of one-standard-deviation 
increase in ACT, CAP, FOR, OFF and PRIV on the market power-stability 
correlation is -2.3%, +7.1%, -32.3%, -7.3% and -9.4%
13
, respectively. Considering 
the negative sign as in the results of model 1, regulation policies tend to undermine 
financial stability, as monopolistic pricing can no longer keep up at the expense of 
potential systemic infection, undisciplined bank management and unreliable 
accounting information. 
The last part of the table gives a prima facie impression of the role of the 
business cycle and the special characteristics of differently specialised banks. The 
intensity of GDP growth rate stabilise profits and concurrently minimise loan losses 
and profit variation while it owes its devastating impact to lower equity capital along 
the lines of the propensity of banks to increase their leverage profile, and follow 
securitisation strategies of poor quality. On the other hand, stock market funding tend 
to have a positive impact on profitability and a negative one on sROA and loan losses, 
although without sufficing to justify its negative sign in tables 1 and 2.  
I also verify considerable significance in the independent effects of interaction 
terms between lagged competition and macroeconomic variables. I conclude that 
GDP growth bolsters the stabilizing bearing of market power across all cases. 
Furthermore, inflation pressures and stock market liquidity does notjeopardise the 
competition-stability nexus. However, in the last column we see clearly the fact that 
regulation policies tend to deprive stock market funding from non-linear correlations 
with bank soundness. As in table 1, the sign of bank-specific factors remains put but 
their statistical significance becomes evident in fewer cases. Looking at the full 
model, fragility is exacerbated by financial institutions with higher asset size, less 
capital buffers, lower cost efficiency and greater portfolio diversification. Only bank 
size has a persistent effect throughout the analysis of model 2, while once the model 
allows for the single interaction between activity restrictions and market power, cost 
efficiency and non-traditional income demonstrate their explanatory power 
accompanied by the destabilising effect of liquid assets. 
 
[Insert table 5 here] 
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 The increase of one standard deviation in ACT, CAP, FOR, OFF, PRIV leads to a Lerner coefficient 
equal to 1.855, 2.033, 1.284, 1.760 and 1.710, respectively. Thus, the relative change is estimated 
considering the initial level (1.898). 
In the grey rows, the extreme bounds of competition and concentration, 
emanated from two to three-variable sets, range in-between the values of [0.326, 
2.775] and [-0.019, -0.005], respectively. For the former case, the model comprises 
[CAP, OFF] and [OFF, PRIV] for its lowestbound and highest bound, respectively; as 
for the interaction HHI*L the bounds are constructed by [OFF, PRIV] and [ACT, 
CAP, OFF] specifications. In addition, the partial correlation both at 5% and 1% 
significance level is fragile and it takes the replacement of one I-variable to change 
sign or lose significance, whereas concentration keeps its robust significance across 
all versions of model 2. Once I plug the squared term, the linear effect across all 
extreme bounds of the Lerner index and its interaction with HHI lies between the 
ranges [0.927. 3.394] and [3.394. 2.340], respectively. Similarly, the quadratic 
variable gets values in-between the bounds[-0.771, -0.809] and [-0.809, -1.316] with a 
persistent significance at 1% level across all specifications. Thus, an increase in the 
Lerner index of one standard deviation drives to higher levels of the Z-scoreby 7.2% 
(61.6%), which is further decomposed to a positive 23.8% (19.4%) change up to a 
point where higher levels of market power lead to a fall by 14.5 (17.8%).  
 
[Insert table 6 here] 
 
 
8. Is the effect of market structure variables altered by the 
interaction between ownership with regulation? 
 
There exist some theories about the correlation between ownership and risk 
being variant along with different national regulatory policies (e.g. John et al. 2008). I 
therefore embark on a sensitivity analysis including interaction terms of regulatory 
variables with foreign ownership (F) to see whether prudential policies are crucially 
determined by certain governance structures. The employed model is the following: 
 
ln Z  f Lt1,CONC, I *F,Bt1            (7) 
Τable 7 confirms a negligible impact of market power on bank riskiness and 
the persistence of concentrated markets in risk-taking behaviour irrespectively of the 
degree of collinearity amongst interaction terms.In the regressions containing one I-
variable each time, there is considerable stand-alone effect of regulation and 
supervision on bank soundness that is materially contingent uponthe degree of foreign 
ownership. In particular, foreign ownership is positively associated with financial 
stability in markets where a) more restrictions are imposed on banks to engage in 
securities, insurance and real estate activities, b) less bank capital reserves are 
required, c) official authorities do intervene in bank managers’ decisions and d) there 
is higher degree of monitoring from rating agencies and auditing authorities.  
Admittedly, the results are in absolute contradistinction with the first two 
models implying that ownership structures may differentiate the impact of 
competition policies especially in (developing) markets where banking integration 
takes the form of M&As, branches and subsidiaries and provision of cross-border 
financial services. There is also significance at 10% level of market power in 
destabilising the financial system the more it is likely that banks under foreign control 
is subject to private scrutiny regarding the transparency of their books. Both capital 
stringency and capital requirements, when coupled with other regulatory policies, 
tend to exacerbate risk-taking behaviour inducing bank managers to make up for 
potential utility loss; especially when it is the case of foreign owner being sufficiently 
large (Laeven and Levine, 2009). As for the rest macroeconomic and bank-specific 
controls, everything is settled even under different information sets. 
 
[Insert table 7 here] 
 
 
9. Are the results robust to alternative measures of risk? 
 
Last, the analysis tests alternative measures of market stability and to what 
degree the fully-fledged model (8) can predict their variation. I therefore employ all 
the components that build up the Z-score along with the logged nominator, the Z-
score with the denominator being averaged over the whole period and credit risk as 
proxied by loan loss charges over average gross loans.  
 
Risk = f [L, CONC, I, M, B) + ε              (8) 
 Market power highly determines at 1% significance level the variation of bank 
profitability, non-performing loans and the Z-score with the denominator averaged 
over the whole period (table 8).Market concentration enters significantly positive in 
the prediction of Z-score and interestingly of loans losses, profit variability and the 
nominator, out of which no one constituent seems to be correlated with it.  
Activity restrictions drive to higher bank profitssince any potential risk 
diversification in non-interest bearing activities is dominated by losses on assets. 
Fragility of the banking system on loan provisioning is crystallised by the efficacy of 
capital regulation. The results provides a clear-cut answer to which policy has a direct 
impact on non performing loans; that is, the more capital reserves are required to be 
set aside, the more managers are incentivised to take refuge in higher risk-return 
profiles. Thus, they are bound to extend their operation by granting more loans either 
to marginal applicants or to customers-defaulters at any level of informational 
asymmetry. Likewise, the share of foreign owned assets in a banking system does 
harm to stability to the extent that is associated with lower profitability, and loan 
losses. That might indicate fierce competition reminiscent of contestable markets, in 
which incumbent banks strive to survive potential market entries. 
The degree of intervention of official authorities guarantees stability through 
greater quality of earning assets, the preservation of capital levels abiding by the 
Basel rules, and healthy loan portfolio devoid of excessive subordinate risks.Hence, 
the latter is not expected ex ante since stricter authorities tend to intervene in bank 
decisions through suspending dividends, superseding the rights of shareholders 
thereby demoralizing potential investors. Such burden on bank management that 
otherwisemight provoke corruption in lending activities is not the case in our analysis; 
however, authorities are failing to keep pace with bank business inspection as overall 
risk is underestimated therebyendangering bank solvency with sub par policies. 
Moreover, the fact that financial institutions are exposed to private sector surveillance 
appears beneficialfor banks to preserve high levels of equity capital and credit 
rationing. 
We also observe GDP growth to predict significantly bank stability and 
profitability along with less credit risk and variation in profits. In contrast, 
inflationary pressures drive to diminishing asset returns at 1% significance level. 
Furthermore, stock market activity tends to stabilize the banking sector on the 
grounds that the increase in profits outpaces the losses occurred in lending activities. 
Hence, in cases of higher elasticity of aggregate demand, more resources of market 
funding make banks engage in excessive risk taking and therefore provide less 
credible information to the public. 
As for the bank-level controls, financial fragility is attributed to asset size, 
which tends to diminish equity capital at 1% significance level as expected by 
construction. The level of equity capital seems to increase returns on assetsat the 
expense of considerably higher profit volatility and loan losses. Cost efficient banks 
tend to enjoy profits and sufficient capital base, and those expanding their business to 
insurance, trading and real estate products exacerbate operational risk through profit 
volatility and credit risk. Last, liquid assets has a more negligent negative bearing in 
previous specification, although its destabilising tendency is partially offset by higher 
profitability and capital buffers.  
 
[Insert table 8 here] 
 
10. Concluding remarks 
This study addresses whether the relationship between market structure and 
financial stability is significant under different specifications for the European Union 
since the advent of the common currency. In a nutshell, it endorses the concentration-
fragility nexus, while the inverse U-shaped correlation between the Lerner index and 
Z-score comes along to reconcile mutually exclusive theories employing a) linear 
effects of regulatory and supervisory variables, b) interactions of I-variables with 
bank market power, d) interactions of I-variables with foreign ownership, and f) 
different dependent variables that encompass different aspects of bank risk. 
The results show a fragile relationship between the Lerner index and Z-score 
both at 5% and 1% significance level, when utilising the effect of I-variables in levels 
(model 1). When interactions come into play, the Lerner index follows the same 
pattern taking account of different-sized information sets. We also trace this U-shaped 
relationship, according to which market power seems to empower bank solvency up 
to the level of 0.644, where monopolistic behaviour have devastating repercussions.  
Concentrated markets are highly correlated with financial fragility across any 
specification and robustness check. However, fragility emanates from bank managers 
who engage in risk-taking in lending transactions and other non-interest income 
activities. 
Besides, we come up with collateral issues that have been appealing in many 
studies in terms of the policy implications they put forward. In general, the majority 
of institutional variables are capable of affecting bank stability individually. When I 
assess their significance, more financial stability is traced in markets where we 
observe more capital regulation and foreign ownership while requirements of 
information dissemination, restrictions on non-traditional activities as well as 
supervisory intervention tend to destabilise the financial system. However, the pattern 
appears remarkably the opposite in markets with higher share of foreign-owned 
banks, where stability is fostered by restrictions on activities, management and 
information transparency alongside lower capital reserves.  
Competition policy should promote the mandate of less concentration and take 
preemptive action towards less monopolistic pricing especially in times of high 
inflation and stock market activity, when banks tend to price 73.3% above their 
marginal cost. Higher capital buffers in Basel directives vis-à-vis potential losses on 
risky OBS allocations, although indispensable in the wake of the crisis, constitute the 
stabilising precondition of too-expensive-to-fail incumbent banks. Official 
intervention, book transparency and activity restrictions operate under a 
heterogeneous European framework that induce negative repercussions on bank 
soundness due to the per se monopolistic pricing of concentrated markets. Policy 
makers should evaluate the level of foreign penetration in a market, the change of 
market power over time and how institutional reforms have been evolving in order to 
identify how, to what extent, bank solvency is by all means preserved.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  
Z-score Lerner TA TC/TI 
TNINTI/
TI 
LIQ/DE
PSTF 
CONC GDPGR Inflation 
Stock 
MT 
Activity 
R. 
Capital 
Reg. 
Foreign  
Own 
Official 
Sup. 
Private 
Mon.   
Austria 195.174 0.325 5873.057 0.659 0.203 0.365 0.265 0.023 0.020 0.350 6.333 5.666 0.144 11.666 5.666 
Belgium  88.257 0.157 44573.660 0.652 0.295 0.417 0.796 0.020 0.023 0.678 7.333 5.000 0.210 9.666 6.333 
Denmark 53.973 0.243 9384.117 0.602 0.211 0.360 0.591 0.014 0.020 0.634 9.666 5.333 0.139 9.666 7.666 
Finland 41.317 -0.174 34316.880 0.657 0.386 0.498 0.922 0.031 0.016 1.064 8.000 5.666 0.317 7.333 7.000 
France 155.072 0.150 36018.890 0.659 0.306 0.426 0.435 0.015 0.021 0.812 8.000 6.000 0.091 7.333 8.000 
Germany 901.771 0.157 5417.424 0.718 0.180 0.230 0.345 0.014 0.019 0.453 7.000 6.666 0.151 10.000 6.666 
Greece 47.408 0.152 18160.340 0.657 0.215 0.317 0.674 0.035 0.035 0.587 9.000 5.666 0.108 10.000 7.000 
Ireland 67.648 -0.149 40898.670 0.395 0.037 0.871 0.476 0.039 0.031 0.524 7.000 4.000 0.140 9.333 8.333 
Italy 253.199 0.156 6903.262 0.669 0.199 0.349 0.387 0.008 0.025 0.425 10.666 5.000 0.056 5.000 9.000 
Luxemburg 80.982 0.291 7723.828 0.551 0.283 0.834 0.309 0.040 0.031 1.638 8.333 6.333 0.647 12.000 7.000 
Netherlands 57.767 0.057 88215.220 0.664 0.159 0.657 0.838 0.020 0.021 0.922 6.000 6.000 0.067 6.666 7.333 
Portugal 70.247 0.411 12145.250 0.746 0.201 0.484 0.720 0.009 0.028 0.396 10.000 6.000 0.185 13.666 7.333 
Spain 336.367 0.102 22986.740 0.569 0.171 0.219 0.446 0.030 0.034 0.880 6.666 8.000 0.094 9.666 7.666 
Sweden 66.267 0.515 12957.060 0.597 0.210 0.236 0.596 0.027 0.018 1.007 9.000 2.500  7.000 8.000 
UK 176.974 0.803 52002.790 0.735 0.351 0.726 0.387 0.023 0.020 1.247 4.666 4.666 0.402 7.666 8.666 
EU-15 172.828 0.213 26505.146 0.635 0.227 0.466 0.546 0.023 0.024 0.774 7.844 5.500 0.197 9.111 7.444 
Cyprus 25.583 -0.008 5458.085 0.627 0.090 0.468 0.739 0.036 0.028 0.579 11.000 7.000 0.169 10.000 8.333 
Czech R. 54.279 0.133 6219.384 0.670 0.303 0.291 0.605 0.047 0.024 0.283 12.000 5.500 0.872 9.500 8.500 
Estonia 29.180 0.331 985.089 0.675 0.372 0.782 0.949 0.062 0.048 0.314 7.666 5.666 0.991 12.666 7.000 
Hungary 52.143 0.317 2134.387 0.823 0.180 0.648 0.568 0.032 0.054 0.260 9.333 9.666 0.628 14.000 7.666 
Latvia 28.784 0.600 1318.662 0.638 0.296 0.485 0.550 0.073 0.071 0.107 7.666 7.000 0.441 11.666 7.000 
Lithuania 51.082 0.764 1844.011 0.692 0.254 0.295 0.745 0.075 0.034 0.224 9.333 5.333 0.849 12.000 7.000 
Malta 61.043 0.639 1891.901 0.704 0.109 0.597 0.733 0.025 0.025 0.536 10.666 6.666 0.623 13.666 7.333 
Poland 70.046 0.219 3406.975 0.674 0.248 0.337 0.594 0.046 0.024 0.286 9.666 4.666 0.529 9.333 7.333 
Slovakia 84.259 0.065 4554.698 0.671 0.340 0.364 0.734 0.066 0.046 0.069 11.333 5.333 0.604 13.000 6.666 
Slovenia 119.091 0.023 1428.511 0.709 0.201 0.250 0.591 0.045 0.045 0.310 9.666 7.333 0.303 13.333 7.333 
Bulgaria 74.998 0.540 908.921 0.735 0.249 0.429 0.464 0.061 0.067 0.202 8.666 7.333 0.500 11.333 7.000 
Romania 40.285 0.546 2253.744 0.797 0.258 0.506 0.624 0.064 0.112 0.170 9.333 5.333 0.272 10.000 5.333 
EU-12 57.564 0.347 2700.364 0.701 0.242 0.454 0.658 0.053 0.048 0.278 9.694 6.402 0.565 11.708 7.208 
Z-score: the unlogged version of Z-score before winsorizing it; Lerner: the Lerner index before winsorizing it, in order to draw remarks on its mean values across the European region; TA: 
total assets; TC/TI: total cost over total income; TNINTI/TI: total non-interest income over total income; LIQ/DEPSTF: liquid assets over total deposits and short-term funding; CONC: 
market concentration; GDPGR: the growth rate of GDP; Inflation: inflation rate; Stock MT: stock market turnover; Activity R.: activity restrictions; Capital Reg.: Capital regulation index; 
Foreign Own.: the share of foreign-owned assets in a banking industry; Official Sup.: official supervisory power; Fraction ED: fraction of entry denied; Private Mon.: Private monitoring 
index. EU-15: the average values of all variables deflated by the number of banks within a banking market; EU-12: the average values of all variables deflated by the number of banks 
within a banking market including Bulgaria and Romania of the enlarged European Union. Source: World Bank, Bankscope and own estimations. 
Table 2: Correlation matrix between country-level variables 
Variables CONC GDPGR Inflation 
Stock 
MT 
Activity 
res 
Capital   
Reg. 
Foreign   
own. 
Official 
Sup. 
Private   
Mon. 
CONC 1         
GDPGR 0.141* 1        
Inflation 0.222* 0.356* 1       
Stock MT 0.071* 0.252* -0.027* 1      
Activity Res 0.135* -0.041* 0.144* -0.283* 1     
Capital Reg. -0.055* -0.042* -0.061* -0.101* -0.087* 1    
Foreign Own 0.181* 0.277* 0.133* 0.328* -0.099* -0.027* 1   
Official Sup. -0.077* -0.011 -0.028* -0.315* 0.009 0.334* 0.281* 1  
Private Mon. 0.030* 0.057* 0.033* 0.333* 0.306* -0.095* 0.139* -0.459* 1 
Source: Bankscope database, World Bank. 
 
 
Table 3: Regression output of model 1 
Variables Baseline Sensitivity analysis 
Lerner 
-0.158*** -0.350*** 0.089** -0.129*** -0.145*** -0.055 -0.088 
(0.000) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.036) (0.054) 
Concentration  
-0.011*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Institutional variables (Regulation, supervision, governance) 
Activity restrictions 
 -0.082***     -0.014* 
 (0.005)     (0.008) 
Capital regulation 
  0.111***    0.078*** 
  (0.006)    (0.009) 
Foreign ownership 
   0.133**   -0.034 
   (0.053)   (0.075) 
Official supervision 
    0.004  -0.069*** 
    (0.004)  (0.007) 
Private monitoring 
     -0.111*** -0.085*** 
     (0.008) (0.012) 
Country-specific variables 
GDPGR 
0.048*** 0.026*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Inflation 
-0.078*** -0.039*** -0.093*** -0.097*** -0.076*** -0.081*** -0.062*** 
(0.000) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Stock market 
turnover 
-0.241*** -0.303*** -0.251*** -0.093*** -0.220*** -0.179*** -0.175*** 
(0.000) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.032) 
Bank-specific variables 
Q 
-0.006 -0.010* -0.015*** -0.028*** -0.011** -0.006 -0.018*** 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
E/TA 
-0.079 0.404*** 0.094 0.024 -0.070 0.121 0.516*** 
(0.110) (0.118) (0.111) (0.118) (0.111) (0.111) (0.123) 
Cost to income 
-0.028 -0.155*** 0.010 -0.072* -0.030 -0.017 -0.114*** 
(0.040) (0.034) (0.044) (0.043) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) 
TNINTINC/TI 
-0.589*** -0.599*** -0.636*** -0.615*** -0.596*** -0.590*** -0.684*** 
(0.050) (0.053) (0.052) (0.054) (0.051) (0.051) (0.055) 
Liquidity 
-0.011 -0.029** -0.014 -0.024* -0.010 -0.023* -0.027* 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Specialisation 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.2188 0.2401 0.2417 0.235 0.2213 0.2329 0.2617 
Obs 12118 9529 11956 11136 11956 11956 8709 
Banks 2450 2432 2447 2361 2447 2447 2346 
Countries 27 27 27 26 27 27 26 
OLS model with standard errors clustered at the country level and adjusted by the number of banks operating within each 
market employing time dummies to capture time varying fixed effects. The first column reports the results of the baseline 
model totally devoid of any institutional controls. The table then includes one at a time interacting controls for regulation, 
supervision and governance with the Lerner index, in order to verify their stand-alone effect on bank stability as well as 
their compound explanatory power in the last column. Z-score is logged after 1% winsoring and all bank-specific 
variables are lagged one period to avoid the possibility of reverse causality. Standard errors are in parentheses while 
asterisks ***, **, * denote the significance level being at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 4: Extreme bounds of model 1 
Variables Bounds Coefficient Std. error t-value I-variables 
Significance 
(1%) 
Significance 
(5%) 
Lerner 
low -0.368 0.039 -9.380 ACT, OFF 
Fragile(0) Fragile(0) base -0.158 0.036 -4.410 - 
high 0.096 0.037 2.550 CAP, PRIV 
Lerner 
low 0.785 0.095 8.280 ACT, OFF 
Infection points [0.733, 0.644, 
0.97] 
base 0.565 0.097 5.800 - 
high 0.585 0.096 6.120 CAP, PRIV 
Lerner^2 
low -1.071 0.239 -4.490 ACT, OFF 
base -0.877 0.111 -7.860 - 
high -0.603 0.113 -5.330 CAP, PRIV 
CONC 
low -0.009 0.001 -12.710 OFF, PRIV 
Robust Robust base -0.011 0.001 -15.400 - 
high -0.008 0.001 -12.130 
ACT, CAP, 
PRIV 
Lerner 
low 0.608 0.094 6.440 OFF, PRIV 
Infection points [0.695, 0.644, 
0.627] 
base 0.565 0.097 5.800 - 
high 0.760 0.096 7.940 
ACT, CAP, 
PRIV 
Lerner^2 
low -0.875 0.111 -7.820 OFF, PRIV 
base -0.877 0.111 -7.860 - 
high -1.213 0.124 -9.780 
ACT, CAP, 
PRIV 
Following model 1, the table reposts the extreme bounds of the Lerner index and concentration with the respective standard 
errors and t-values. The column ‘I-variables’ indicates the specific information set that constructs the underlying bound, 
and the last two underline the relationship between market structure and financial stability as fragile or robust at 1% and 
5% significance level according to whether their sign and significance persistently remains stable over many specifications. 
The rows in grey report the extreme bounds of L and HHI utilizing two and three-variable I-sets while in the two rows 
below them, the L-squared term comes in ad hoc for every extreme bound case in order to check for non-linearities. 
Infection points refer to the levels in Lerner distribution where the respective coefficient switches its sign.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Regression output of model 2 
Variables Baseline Sensitivity analysis 
Lerner 
1.413*** 2.071*** 0.326** 0.117 1.153*** 2.071*** 1.898*** 
(0.143) (0.154) (0.156) (0.164) (0.146) (0.213) (0.397) 
CONC*L 
-0.024*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.000 -0.022*** -0.020*** 0.015*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Institutional variables (Regulation, supervision, governance) 
Activity restrictions*L 
 -0.107***     -0.043** 
 (0.014)     (0.018) 
Capital regulation*L 
  0.146***    0.135*** 
  (0.015)    (0.029) 
Foreign ownership*L 
   -0.181   -0.614*** 
   (0.128)   (0.190) 
Official supervision*L 
    0.014*  -0.138*** 
    (0.008)  (0.024) 
Private monitoring*L 
     -0.105*** -0.179*** 
     (0.018) (0.035) 
Country-specific variables 
GDPGR*L 
0.037*** 0.004 0.016* 0.041*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.043*** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Inflation*L 
-0.074*** -0.098*** -0.075*** -0.108*** -0.065*** -0.072*** -0.115*** 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
Stock market 
turnover*L 
-0.528*** -0.892*** -0.360*** 0.023 -0.448*** -0.407*** -0.046 
(0.062) (0.070) (0.061) (0.075) (0.061) (0.061) (0.087) 
Bank-specific variables 
Q 
-0.008 -0.044*** -0.011* -0.032*** -0.014** -0.012** -0.019*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
E/TA 
-0.180 0.080 -0.147 -0.087 -0.164 -0.138 0.360*** 
(0.114) (0.122) (0.112) (0.117) (0.114) (0.114) (0.119) 
Cost to income 
-0.014 -0.177*** 0.019 -0.060 -0.016 -0.003 -0.119** 
(0.047) (0.043) (0.049) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
TNINTINC/TI 
-0.590*** -0.991*** -0.613*** -0.604*** -0.597*** -0.606*** -0.691*** 
(0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052) (0.056) 
Liquidity 
-0.009 -0.053*** -0.011 -0.018 -0.009 -0.010 -0.022 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.143) 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Specialisation 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.2074 0.1678 0.2177 0.2276 0.2118 0.2135 0.2412 
Obs 12118 9529 11956 11136 11956 11956 8709 
Banks 2450 2447 2408 2361 2447 2447 2346 
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 26 
OLS model with standard errors clustered at the country level and adjusted by the number of banks operating within each 
market employing time dummies to capture time varying fixed effects. The first column reports the results of the baseline 
model totally devoid of any institutional controls; however, the possibility of country-level factors affecting bank 
soundness in slopes through their interaction with bank competition is investigated. The table then includes one at a time 
interacting controls for regulation, supervision and governance with the Lerner index, in order to verify their stand-alone 
effect on bank stability as well as their compound explanatory power in the last column. Z-score is logged after 1% 
winsoring and all bank-specific variables are lagged one period to avoid the possibility of reverse causality. Standard 
errors are in parentheses while asterisks ***, **, * denote the significance level being at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 6: Extreme bounds of model 2 
Variables Bounds Coefficient Std. error t-value B-variables 
Significance 
(1%) 
Significance 
(5%) 
Lerner 
low 0.326 0.156 2.090 CAP, OFF 
Fragile(0) Fragile(0) base 1.414 0.143 9.860 - 
high 2.775 0.323 8.580 OFF, PRIV 
Lerner 
low 0.927 0.185 5.010 CAP, OFF 
Fragile base 1.986 0.165 12.050 - 
high 3.394 0.350 9.690 OFF, PRIV 
Lerner^2 
low -0.771 0.125 -6.150 CAP, OFF 
Robust base -0.847 0.118 -7.170 - 
high -0.809 0.119 -6.790 OFF, PRIV 
CONC*L 
low -0.019 0.002 8.73 OFF, PRIV 
Robust Robust base -0.024 0.002 -11.480 - 
high -0.005 0.002 -2.050 ACT, CAP, OFF 
Lerner 
low 3.394 0.350 9.690 OFF, PRIV 
Fragile base 1.986 0.165 12.050 - 
high 2.340 0.225 10.420 ACT, CAP, OFF 
Lerner^2 
low -0.809 0.119 -6.790 OFF, PRIV 
Robust base -0.847 0.118 -7.170 - 
high -1.316 0.134 -9.810 ACT, CAP, OFF 
Following model 2, the table reposts the extreme bounds of the Lerner index and the interaction term CONC*L with the 
respective standard errors and t-values. The column ‘I-variables’ indicates the specific information set that constructs the 
underlying bound, and the last two underline the relationship between market structure and financial stability as fragile or 
robust at 1% and 5% significance level according to whether their sign and significance persistently remains stable over 
many specifications. The rows in grey report the extreme bounds of L and CONC*L utilizing two and three-variable I-
sets while in the two rows below them, the L-squared term comes in ad hoc for every extreme bound case in order to 
check for non-linearities. Infection points refer to the levels in Lerner distribution where the respective coefficient 
switches its sign.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Sensitivity analysis 
Variables Sensitivity analysis 
Lerner 
-0.035 -0.073 -0.051 -0.099* -0.014 
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Concentration 
-0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Institutional variables (Regulation, supervision) 
Activity restrictions 
-0.041*** -0.011 -0.014* -0.012 -0.019** 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Capital regulation 
0.073*** 0.099*** 0.071*** 0.077*** 0.099*** 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
Official supervision 
-0.062*** -0.071*** -0.082*** -0.073*** -0.087*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) 
Private monitoring 
-0.080*** -0.082*** -0.094*** -0.105*** -0.113*** 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) 
Foreign ownership (F) 
-0.983*** 0.507*** -1.025*** -0.850*** -1.736*** 
(0.167) (0.195) (0.200) (0.319) (0.387) 
Activity restrictions*F 
0.114***    0.050** 
(0.017)    (0.022) 
Capital regulation*F 
 -0.091***   -0.133*** 
 (0.032)   (0.031) 
Official supervision*F 
  0.087***  0.099*** 
  (0.017)  (0.019) 
Private monitoring*F 
   0.105*** 0.122*** 
   (0.037) (0.043) 
Country-specific variables 
GDPGR 
0.032*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.026*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Inflation 
-0.071*** -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.064*** 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Stock market turnover 
-0.161*** -0.175*** -0.130*** -0.175*** -0.116*** 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) 
Bank-specific variables 
Q 
-0.016*** -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.015** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
E/TA 
0.580*** 0.501*** 0.554*** 0.539*** 0.593*** 
(0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.125) (0.123) 
Cost to income 
-0.094** -0.115*** -0.096** -0.115*** -0.087** 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
TNINTINC/TI 
-0.685*** -0.691*** -0.694*** -0.675*** -0.694*** 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) 
Liquidity 
-0.032** -0.024* -0.031** -0.029** -0.031** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Specialisation dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.2644 0.2623 0.2638 0.2624 0.2669 
Obs 8709 8709 8709 8709 8709 
Banks 2346 2346 2346 2346 2346 
Countries 26 26 26 26 26 
OLS model with standard errors clustered at the country level and adjusted by the number of banks operating 
within each market employing time dummies to capture time varying fixed effects. The table includes 
interacting controls of regulation, supervision with foreign ownership. Standard errors are in parentheses while 
asterisks ***, **, * denote the significance level being at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Table 8: Alternative measures of stability 
Variables ROA E/TA sROA ln(ROA+E/TA) Loan losses lnZ 
Lerner 
0.007*** -0.001 -0.000 0.009 0.006*** -0.337*** 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.074) 
Concentration 
0.000 0.000 0.0001*** 0.0002* 0.000** -0.006*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Other Governance indicators 
Activity restrictions 
0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.025*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) 
Capital regulation 
0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001*** 0.072*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.012) 
Foreign ownership 
-0.004*** 0.014 0.002 0.008 0.003* -0.214** 
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010) (0.002) (0.094) 
Official supervision 
0.0004*** 0.002** -0.000 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.083*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) 
Private monitor 
0.000 0.009*** -0.000 0.009*** -0.002*** -0.064*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.016) 
Country-specific variables 
GDPGR 
0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** 0.036*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) 
Inflation 
-0.000 -0.001 0.001*** -0.001 0.000 -0.074*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.012) 
Stock market 
turnover 
0.002*** -0.004 -0.001* -0.004 -0.005*** -0.065 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.041) 
Bank-specific variables 
Q 
0.000 -0.017*** -0.000 -0.017*** 0.000 -0.033*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.008) 
E/TA 
0.027*** 
- 
0.035*** 
- 
0.027*** 1.076*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.182) 
Cost to income 
-0.013*** -0.027*** 0.002 -0.041*** 0.001 -0.490*** 
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.055) 
TNINTINC/TI 
0.014*** 0.098*** 0.012*** 0.110*** 0.005** -1.321*** 
(0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.084) 
Liquidity 
0.001* 0.050*** 0.000 0.053*** -0.001 -0.039 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.024) 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Specialisation 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.2735 0.3991 0.3063 0.4103 0.1064 0.3772 
Obs 9568 9571 8785 9568 8984 9568 
Banks 2374 2374 2348 2374 2247 2374 
Countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 
OLS model with standard errors clustered at the country level and adjusted by the number of banks operating 
within each market employing time dummies to capture time varying fixed effects. The first column reports the 
results of the baseline model, that is the regression of alternative measures of risk on the whole information set. 
Standard errors are in parentheses while asterisks ***, **, * denote the significance level being at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
Appendix 
 
Information on Bank Regulatory and Supervision Variables 
Variable  Methodology of quantification  Source  
Activity 
restrictions 
(ACT) 
I assign values of 1, 2, 3, 4 if bank participation indicates ‘unrestricted’, 
‘permitted’, ‘restricted’ or ‘prohibited’ responses to the following questions: 
What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for a) bank participation in 
securities activities (the ability of banks to engage in the business of securities 
underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry), 
b) bank participation in insurance activities (the ability of banks to engage in 
insurance underwriting and selling)?, c) bank participation in real estate 
activities (the ability of banks to engage in real estate investment, 
development, and management)?, d) bank ownership of nonfinancial firms? 
Barth et al. 
(2004; 2005; 
2008; 2012) 
(Capital 
regulation 
(CAP) 
I assign ‘0’ and ‘1’ if the responses are ‘no’ and ‘yes’, respectively. The 
opposite holds for questions 8 and 9 (Yes:0, No:1) and we also assign ‘1’ if 6 
< 0.75.  The questions are: 1) Is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement 
risk weighted in line with the Basel guidelines?, 2) Does the minimum ratio 
vary as a function of market risk?, 3) Are market value of loan losses not 
realized in accounting books deducted? 4) Are unrealized losses in securities 
portfolios deducted, 5) Are unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted?, 6) 
What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital?, 7) Are the 
sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory 
authorities?, 8) Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of 
capital be done with assets other than cash or government securities?, 9) Can 
initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds? 
Barth et al. 
(2004; 2005; 
2008; 2012) 
Official 
Supervisory 
power 
(OFF)  
I assign ‘0’ and ‘1’ if the responses are ‘no’ and ‘yes’ (respectively) and add 
them up. The questions are the following: 1) Does the supervisory agency 
have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report without 
the approval of the bank?, 2) Are auditors required by law to communicate 
directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank 
directors or senior managers in elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse?, 3) 
Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence?, 4) 
Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal 
organizational structure?, 5) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to 
supervisors?, 6) Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or 
management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses?, 7) 
Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision to distribute 
Dividends, 8) Bonuses, 9)Management fees?, 10) Can the supervisory agency 
legally declare-such that this declaration supersedes the rights of bank 
shareholders-that a bank is insolvent?, 11) Does the Banking Law give 
authority to the supervisory agency tointervene that is, suspend some or all 
ownership rights-a problem bank?, 12) Regarding bank restructuring and 
reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency 
supersede shareholder rights?, 13) remove and replace management?, 14) 
remove and replace directors?. 
Barth et al. 
(2004; 2005; 
2008; 2012) 
Private 
monitoring 
index 
(PRIV)  
I assign ‘0’ and ‘1’ if the responses are ‘no’ and ‘yes’, respectively. We 
construct the index through the formula: {(1*2)+[1 if 3 equals 100%; 0 
otherwise]+[1 if 4 and 5 equals zero; 0 otherwise]+[(6-‘1’)*(‘-
1’)+7+8]+9+10+11}. The question are the following: 1) Is an external audit a 
compulsory obligation for banks? , 2) Are auditors licensed or certified?, 3) 
What percent of the top ten banks are rated by international credit rating 
agencies (e.g., Moody's, Standard and Poor)?, 4) Is there an explicit deposit 
insurance protection system?, 5) Were depositors wholly compensated (to the 
extent of legal protection) the last time a bank failed?, 6) Does accrued, 
though unpaid interest/principal enter the income statement while the loan is 
still non-performing?, 7) Are financial institutions required to produce 
consolidated accounts covering all bank and any non-bank financial 
subsidiaries?, 8) Are bank directors legally liable if information disclosed is 
erroneous or misleading?, 9) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to the 
public?, 10) Must banks disclose their risk management procedures to the 
public?, 11) Is subordinated debt allowable (required) as part of capital?  
Barth et al. 
(2004; 2005; 
2008; 2012) 
Foreign 
Ownership 
(FOR) 
What fraction of the banking system's assets is in banks that are 50% or more 
foreign owned? 
Barth et al. 
(2004; 2005; 
2008; 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
